Signcryption is a basic cryptographic primitive that simultaneously captures the functions of encryption and signature. To realize comprehensive information security against quantum computing attacks, lattice-based signcryption schemes have been successively proposed. However, the performance of signcryption schemes should be improved in the lattice setting. An efficient lattice-based signcryption scheme in the standard model is proposed in this paper. Under the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption and the ideal short integer solution (ISIS) assumption, the proposed signcryption scheme achieves indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen-message attack (EUF-ACMA). Our scheme not only reduces the communication and computational overhead but also realizes a new design that combines the partitioning technique with the idea of tag-based key encapsulation. The performance analysis results show that our scheme is more efficient than previous lattice-based signcryption schemes in the standard model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The signcryption scheme proposed by Zheng provides message authentication, confidentiality, integrity and nonrepudiation of data simultaneously [1] . Hence, signcryption is more efficient than a direct combination of encryption and signature. Subsequently, some other signcryption schemes were proposed [2] - [4] . In general, there are two design ideas in signcryption: public key signcryption and hybrid signcryption. Shor pointed out that the large integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem can be broken by a quantum algorithm in polynomial time [5] . Therefore, the design of quantum-resistant signcryption schemes has very important theoretical significance and realistic expectations for the future. Fortunately, as an important representative of post-quantum cryptosystems, lattice-based cryptosystems provide a rich opportunity to build post-quantum signcryption schemes. No one has yet The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chien-Ming Chen . produced such a quantum algorithm to break the worst-case problem over a lattice.
Lattice-based cryptosystems have rapidly become a research hotspot, especially in recent years. The security of lattice-based cryptographic constructions is supported by worst-case problems over a lattice. The Gaussian sampling algorithm, modular addition, and vector multiplication are used in lattice-based cryptographic algorithms that are optimized constantly. The asymptotic efficiency of a lattice-based cryptographic algorithm is higher than that for traditional number theory.
A. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
Currently, lattice-based signcryption schemes are being proposed. In 2012, Li et al. [6] constructed a lattice-based signcryption scheme with a random oracle model (ROM) based on the preimage sampling function and hash-based signature proposed by Peikert [7] . Wang et al. [8] used the preimage sampling function and an indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) secure encryption algorithm [9] to construct a lattice-based hybrid encryption scheme that was proven to be secure in the ROM. In 2013, Yan et al. [10] constructed a lattice-based signcryption scheme that was proven to be secure in the standard model. In [10] , Yan et al. first used the trapdoor generation technique proposed by Micciancio and Peikert [11] to build a chameleon hash function, then promoted a signature scheme from existential unforgeability under static chosen-message attack (EUF-SCMA) security to existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack (EUF-ACMA) security, and finally improved an encryption scheme from IND-CCA1 security to IND-CCA2 security by utilizing a CCA secure symmetric encryption algorithm and a collision-resistant hash function. In 2019, Yan et al. [12] constructed an attribute-based signcryption scheme from a lattice in the standard model. Lu et al. [13] in 2014 constructed a lattice-based signcryption scheme in the standard model. In [13] , Lu et al. used Boyen's SUF-ACMA secure signature [14] and broke the malleability of ciphertext by adopting the bimode encryption method. Xiang et al. [15] designed an attribute-based signcryption scheme from a lattice in the ROM. Lu et al. [16] constructed an IND-CPA secure signcryption scheme based on a signature without a trapdoor [17] and strengthened the scheme to IND-CCA2 secure signcryption in the ROM by employing Fujisaki-Okamoto's transformation technique [18] . Although the ROM simplifies the security proof, Leuren and Nguyen [19] showed that the ROM exists as a theoretical fault. Therefore, the design of lattice-based signcryption schemes in the standard model is an important target. Sato and Shikata [20] presented a lattice-based signcryption scheme without a random oracle. Gérard and Merckx [21] proposed a lattice-based signcryption scheme in the ROM. Liu et al. [22] constructed a new lattice-based signcryption scheme in the ROM by combining an RLWE-based signature scheme and an RLWE-based key exchange scheme. Zhang et al. [23] presented a multi-receiver identitybased signcryption scheme from a lattice in the ROM. Meanwhile, some fine-grained signcryption schemes have been constructed, such as [24] - [27] . However, the schemes in [24] - [27] are not anti-quantum schemes.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we propose an improved lattice-based signcryption scheme. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• There are two ways to realize adaptive security in the standard model: dual-system encryption and the partitioning technique. Katsumata and Yamada [28] constructed a homomorphic computation function in 2016 and designed an adaptively secure identity-based encryption scheme from an ideal lattice. Inspired by [28] , we use the partitioning technique to ensure the CCA2 security of the proposed signcryption scheme.
• Boyen [14] in 2010 constructed an EUF-CMA secure signature from a lattice. In 2015, Böhl et al. [29] improved and supplemented Boyen's signature scheme [14] . Based on [29] , in 2016, Libert et al. [30] constructed a signature scheme. Compared with the use of an independent tag for each signature in [29] , Libert used a random bit string tag, which was equivalent to the prime exponent in Camenisch-Lysyanskaya's signature scheme [31] . There are two methods that are used to translate a non-adaptive secure signature into a fully secure signature: the one-time signature technique and the chameleon hash technique. Inspired by [29] , [30] , we construct a chameleon hash from an ideal lattice to ensure the EUF-CMA security of the proposed signcryption. To achieve EUF-ACMA security, we use the confined guessing technique and the tag-based lattice trapdoor to design the signature section.
• In this paper, we introduce the encapsulation idea into the proposed signcryption scheme. The partitioning technique, the bonsai tree technique and the reconciliation technique are closely combined to strengthen the security, which provides a trade-off between efficiency and computation. The proposed signcryption scheme also utilizes ideas to optimize the sizes of the public parameters, private keys and ciphertexts, such as the G-trapdoor technique.
• One of the crucial properties is ciphertext anonymity.
In the signcryption setting, ciphertext anonymity means that ciphertexts contain no information about who created them or to whom they are intended, namely sender privacy and receiver privacy. Libert and Quisquator [3] presented the definition of ciphertext anonymity in the non-identity-based setting. To the best of our knowledge, few lattice-based signcryption schemes exist that consider ciphertext anonymity. In this paper, we discuss the ciphertext anonymity of the proposed signcryption scheme.
C. PAPER OUTLINE
This paper is organized as follows. The necessary preliminaries are introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, the proposed scheme is presented in detail, followed by a correctness and security analysis. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 4.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATION
Z denotes the set of integers. R denotes the set of real numbers. Random variables are denoted by uppercase italic letters (e.g., X). Vectors are column vectors and denoted by bold lower-case letters (e.g., v), and v T denotes the transpose of v. Matrices are sets of column vectors and denoted by bold capital letters (e.g., X). For a vector v ∈ R n , v p denotes the L p -norm. I m denotes an m-order identity matrix. For a matrix A ∈ R n×n , s 1 (A) denotes its spectral norm, and A GS denotes the longest column vector of its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. Define a polynomial ring 2 denotes its maximum singular value. We use [v 1 |v 2 ] (or [V 1 |V 2 ]) and [v 1 ; v 2 ] (or [V 1 ; V 2 ]) to denote the horizontal connection and vertical connection of two vectors (or matrices). For a polynomial ring R over Z, we use [−b, b] R ⊆ R to denote certain elements in R in which coefficients are chosen from [−b, b] . If for all c there exists n 0 such that f (n) < 1 n c 0 holds for n > n 0 , we say that the function f : N → R + is negligible, denoted by negl(n). For a vector v ∈ Z n q , bin(v) ∈ {0, 1} n log 2 q denotes the binary expansion of each component. For x ∈ R, define
is the occurrence probability of an event E. The statistical distance between two random variables X and Y is defined as
B. SIGNCRYPTION: PRIMITIVE AND SECURITY MODEL
Definition 1: The signcryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
• Setup(1 n ): Input the security parameter 1 n , and output the public parameter PP.
• KeyGen(1 n , PP): Input 1 n and PP, and output the public/private key pair (pk, sk). Set (pk s , sk s ) as the sender's public/private key pair. Set (pk r , sk r ) as the receiver's public/private key pair.
• Signcrypt(msg, sk s , pk r ): Signcrypt a message msg with (sk s , pk r ), and output a ciphertext C = Signcrypt(msg, sk s , pk r ).
• Unsigncrypt(C, sk r , pk s ): Unsigncrypt C with (sk r , pk s ).
If unsigncrypted successfully, output msg = Unsigncrypt(C, sk r , pk s ); otherwise, output ⊥. Definition 2: If the following event occurs with an overwhelming advantage, we say that the signcryption scheme is consistent.
A signcryption scheme realizes IND-CCA2 security and EUF-CMA security simultaneously. IND-CCA2 security is defined by a game between a challenger C and an adversary A as follows:
• Initiation. C executes KeyGen(1 n , PP) to generate (pk * r , sk * r ) and sends (pk * r , PP) to A. • Stage 1. A executes a signcryption oracle query and an unsigncryption oracle query adaptively. A provides C with pk s to C. If C is valid, C returns the corresponding plaintext; otherwise, C outputs ⊥.
• Challenge. A selects msg 0 and msg 1 with the same length and sends (msg 0 , msg 1 , pk * s , sk * s ) to C. C chooses b ∈ R {0, 1} at random, executes C * = Signcrypt(msg b , pk * r , pk * s ), and sends C * to A. • Stage 2. A repeats the operations in stage 1 but cannot query the unsigncryption oracles with (C * , pk * s , sk * s ) directly.
The advantage of A in winning the IND-CCA2 game is defined as follows:
If the above-mentioned advantage is negligible for each polynomial bounded adversary, we say that the signcryption has IND-CCA2 security.
EUF-CMA security is defined by a game between a challenger C and a forger F as follows:
• Initiation. C executes KeyGen(1 n , PP) to generate (pk * s , sk * s ) and sends (pk * s , PP) to F. • Signcryption query. F provides msg and (pk r , sk r )
to C. C executes Signcrypt(msg, sk s , pk r ) and returns C to F.
The advantage of F in winning the EUF-CMA game is defined as follows:
msg * is the corresponding plaintext of C * for the sender's public key pk * s with the limitation that C * has not been previously created by the signcryption oracle. If the above-mentioned advantage is negligible for each polynomial bounded adversary, we say that the signcryption has EUF-CMA security.
Definition 3: We say that a signcryption scheme has ciphertext anonymity (i.e., key privacy, denoted by INDK-CCA security) if no PPT distinguisher has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
• The challenger generates two private/public key pairs (sk r,0 , pk r,0 ) and (sk r,1 , pk r,1 ). pk r,0 and pk r,1 are given to the distinguisher D.
• For c = 0 or c = 1, D adaptively performs the queries Signcrypt(msg, sk r,c , pk r ), for any receiver's keys pk r , and Unsigncrypt(C, sk r,c , pk s ).
• Once stage 2 is complete, D outputs two private keys sk s,0 and sk s,1 and a plaintext msg. The challenger then flips two coins b, b ← {0, 1} and computes a challenge ciphertext Signcrypt(msg, sk s,b , pk r,b ).
• D adaptively performs new queries as in stage 2 with the restriction that, this time, it is not allowed to query the unsigncryption of the challenge σ with the private keys sk s,0 and sk s,1 .
• At the end of the game, D outputs the bits f and f and
The advantage of D in winning the INDK-CCA game is defined as follows
C. LATTICE AND GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
Definition 4: For a prime q, A ∈ Z n×m q , u ∈ Z n q , define the following two q-ary lattices:
denotes a standard m-dimensional Gaussian distribution centred at 0 with variance s. For a lattice L, s > 0, the discrete Gaussian distribution is defined as
in which the coefficient vector (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ R n follows the discrete distribution D L,s .
D. RING AND IDEAL LATTICE
This section systemically introduces the concepts of the ring and ideal lattice. A detailed introduction is described in [32] . Let n be a power of 2, with m = 2n, and define a polynomial ring
. Define the coefficient embedding as follows:
a i x i → (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 )
Define the ring homomorphism rot m ,n : R → Z n×n that maps a(x) ∈ R to a matrix over Z n×n , in which the i-th row vector is φ(
Define two multiplication operations as follows:
The following lemma shows that R q = R/ q, m (x) can be regarded as a field. Lemma 1 ( [28] ): Let q be a prime such that q ≡ 3mod 8 and let n be a power of 2. We have the following two conclusions:
1) 2n (x) = x n + 1 splits as x n + 1 ≡ t 1 t 2 mod q for two irreducible polynomials
2) Let n be a power of 2, q be a prime larger than 4n such that q ≡ 3mod 8, and k, k , , ρ ∈ Z + be positive integers satisfying k , ≥ 1, k ≥ 2, and ρ < 1 2 √ q/n. Define the family of hash functions
E. HARD PROBLEMS AND TRAPDOORS
This section introduces two hard problems: ring learning with errors (RLWE) and the ideal short integer solution (ISIS). Lyubashevsky et al. [32] , [33] presented the reduction from the RLWE problem to worst-case SIVP (or SVP) problem. Stehlé et al. [34] defined the ISIS problem and presented the reduction between the ISIS and SIVP.
Definition 6: For n ∈ Z + , k = k(n), and q = q(n) ≥ 2, let χ = χ(n) denote the noise distribution over R q . For a probability polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, its advantage in solving RLWE q,n,m,χ is defined as follows: Adv
If the following advantage is negligible, we say that RLWE q,n,m,χ holds.
. Assume that the prime q satisfies q ≡ 3mod 8 such that there exists another prime p ≡ 1mod m satisfying p ≤ q ≤ 2p. Let αq ≥ n 3/2 k 1/4 ω(log 9/4 n). There exists a PPT reduction algorithm from the SIVP (or SVP) with an O( √ n/α)-approximating factor to RLWE q,n,m,χ .
Definition 7: Let m (x) = x m/2 +1 be an m-degree cyclotomic polynomial. Given a random polynomial set
. . , m) independently; then, the distribution of i a i x i is statistically close to the uniform distribution over R.
Lemma 3 (Trapdoor Generation Algorithm [34] ): The randomized algorithm TrapGen outputs a vector a ∈ R k q and a matrix T a ∈ R k×k , where rot(a T ) T ∈ Z n×nk q is a full-rank matrix and rot(T a ) ∈ Z nk×nk is a basis for ⊥ q (rot(a T ) T ) such that a is negl(n)-close to uniform. Lemma 4 (Preimage Sampling Algorithm [7] ): The preimage sampling algorithm PreSample involves the input of a vector a ∈ R k q , a short basis T a ∈ R k×k as a trapdoor, where rot(a T ) T ∈ Z n×nk q is a full-rank matrix and rot(T a ) ∈ Z nk×nk is a basis for ⊥ q (rot(a T ) T ), a Gaussian parameter σ ≥ rot(T a ) GS · ω( √ log nk), and a vector u ∈ R q . This algorithm works as follows: First, it chooses an arbitrary t ∈ R k q via the linear algebra equation a * t = u(mod q) (except for a negligible fraction of rot(a T ) T such that t always exists). Then, the algorithm outputs e ← (D
F. BONSAI TREE TECHNIQUE AND SAMPLING ALGORITHM Lemma 5 (Left Sampling Algorithm [33] ): Let n be a power of 2 and q be a prime such that q ≡ 3mod 8. The randomized algorithm e ← SampleLeft(a, b, u, T a , σ ) is defined such that, given vectors a, b ∈ R k q , where rot(a T ) T and rot(b T ) T ∈ Z n×nk q are full-rank, an element u ∈ R q , a matrix T a ∈ R k×k such that rot(T a ) ∈ Z nk×nk is the trapdoor basis of the lattice ⊥ (rot(a T ) T ), and a Gaussian parameter σ ≥ rot(T a ) GS · ω( √ log nk), the algorithm outputs a vector e ∈ R 2k sampled from a dis-
Lemma 6 (Right Sampling Algorithm [28] ): The randomized algorithm e ← Sampleright(a, g b , R, y, u, T g 
, and a Gaussian parameter s > s 1 (R) · rot(T g b ) GS · ω( √ log nm), the algorithm outputs a vector e ∈ R 2m sampled from a distribution that is negl(n)-close to D 
G. RECONCILIATION TECHNIQUES
Here, we present a brief description of the reconciliation techniques, as the detailed explanation is elaborated in [35] . Let x = x + 1 2 ∈ Z. Let I 0 = {0, 1, . . . , q 4 − 1} and I 1 = {− q 4 , . . . , −1}. Definition 8: A modular 2 rounding function is defined as
Definition 9: The cross-rounding function is defined as follows:
Lemma 8 ( [35] ): For an even module q, if x ∈ Z q is uniformly random, the distribution of x 2 is the randomly uniform distribution over Z q given x 2 .
Definition 10: For an even module q, for e ∈ E . = [− q 8 , q 8 ) Z, y ∈ Z q and b ∈ Z 2 , define the reconciliation function rec : Z q × Z 2 → Z 2 as follows: Z and x ∈ Z, if y = x + e(mod q), then rec(y, x 2 ) = x 2 = rec(x, x 2 ) holds, given x 2 .
Definition 12: The randomization function is defined as follows:
The random noise e ∈ Z 2 can be 0, 1 or -1 with a probability of 1 2 , 1 4 or 1 4 , respectively. Lemma 9 ( [35] ): For an odd module q, if x ∈ Z q is uniformly random and x ← dbl(x) ∈ Z 2q , then the distribution of x 2 is uniformly random given x 2 .
H. HOMOMORPHIC COMPUTATION
We introduce the homomorphic computation and lemma in [28] . Let d ∈ N. g −1 b is a deterministic polynomial time (PT) algorithm that inputs u ∈ R q and outputs P = g −1 b (u) such that g b P = u. A hash function PubEval d :
. Given y 1 , . . . , y d and R 1 , . . . , R d , the algorithm PubEval d outputs R ∈ R k×k such that PubEval d (b 1 , . . . , b d ) = aR + y 1 · · · · · y d g b ∈ R k q .
III. THE PROPOSED SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME A. CONSTRUCTION
• Setup(1 n ) Let 1 n be the security parameter. Generate the system parameters and components as follows: 1) Let an odd prime q be a prime such that q ≡ 3(mod 8). Let m = 2 κ with κ ≥ 2. Let m (x) = x m/2 + 1 be the m-degree cyclotomic polynomial. Let R = Z[x]/( m (x)) and R q = Z[x]/(q, m (x)).
2) Choose a, b 0 , c 0 ∈ R m q with = O(n), and select u ∈ R q and d ∈ R n lograndomly. Let g b = [1|2| · · · |2 m−1 ], and define G I n ⊗g b as follows:
Note that all of the elements of G on the primary diagonal are g b , while the other elements are 0.
3) Choose the hash functions:
- 
i.e., solve a short vector that satisfies the following equation:
According to Lemma II.4, there exists a PPT algorithm that outputs a trapdoor basis T c 0 ∈ R m×m . Solve the short vector s 1 that is negl(n)-close to D • KeyGen(1 n , PP) Execute TrapGen to generate (pk s = a s ∈ R m q , sk s = T a s ∈ R m×m ) and generate (pk r = a r ∈ R m q , sk r = T a r ∈ R m×m ). rot(T a s ) ∈ Z nm×nm is the trapdoor basis of ⊥ q (rot a s T ) T , while rot(T a r ) ∈ Z nm×nm is the trapdoor basis of ⊥ (rot a r T ) T . We explain the algorithm TrapGen in detail below. Generate the random polynomials a 1 = (a 1 , . . . , a m 1 ) T ∈ R m 1 ×1 q . Construct a random matrix a 2 with a structured matrix T a s ∈ R m×m such that T a s * a s = 0 and T a s is a basis of the module ⊥ (rot a s T ) T , where a s = [a 1 |a 2 ]. First construct an HNF-like basis F of the module ⊥ (rot a s T ) T with a s . Next, construct a unimodular matrix Q such that T a s = QF is a short basis of the module. More precisely, T a s has the following form:
By setting B, the lower triangular matrix with diagonal coefficients, equal to 1, the matrix Q is unimodular. In this design principle, we hope that F * a s = 0. Hence, we should set H * a 1 = 0 and a 2 = −U * a 1 .
By setting H to be an HNF-like matrix, we can guarantee that H is a basis of ⊥ q (rot a 1 T ) T and that F is a basis of ⊥ q (rot a s T ) T . By setting U = W + R, with W and R being a random matrix, we have that a 2 is almost uniformly random in R. The i-th row of R is chosen from ({−1, 0, 1} n ) r × ({0} n ) m 1 −r . The specific construction methods of H and W are described in [34] , so we omit them here. In a similar way, we can generate T a r . 
Finally, output the ciphertext C = (τ, c 0 , c 1 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ).
• Unsigncrypt(C, sk r , pk s ) 1) Compute E = a r |c 3 .
2) Sample e 3 ∈ R m q , where each column vector of the matrix rot(e 3 T ) T ∈ Z n×nm q follows D Z nm ,2 . 3) By using sk r = T a r , find the short solution z = e 2 ∈ R m q of the equation a r * z = c 0 − c 3 * e 3 .
4)
Compute w 1 = c 4 * e 2 |e 3 , rec(w 1 , c 1 ) = w 1 2 . 5) Compute DK H 2 w 1 2 (c 5 ), and parse the result as H 1 ( msg, a r ) ∈ R m q , and build c M = b 0 * h + c 0 * φ −1 φ(s 1 ) . Next, verify whether the following two conditions hold
If the conditions hold, output msg; otherwise, output ⊥.
B. CORRECTNESS
Lemma 11: If 4σ 1 mn + √ n · (1 + 2σ 1 ) ≤ q 4 , the receiver can correctly unsigncrypt with an overwhelming advantage.
Proof: Compute Let e be the random noise of e ← dbl(w); then, we have w = 2w − e. The receiver can unsigncrypt correctly with an overwhelming advantage if 2e + e ≤ q 4 holds, i.e., if the following condition holds:
2e + e 2 ≤ 2 [e 3,1 |e 3,2 ] * e 2 e 3 2 + 2 e 2 2 + e 2
C. SECURITY
Theorem 2: The proposed signcryption scheme has EUF-CMA security under the ISIS q,n,m hard problem.
Proof: Suppose there exists a forger F that can forge the signcryption and that there exists a simulator that can forge the signature of the SUF-CMA signature scheme.
Initiation. F executes KeyGen and Signcrypt to obtain PP and (A * s , T * s ) and sends PP and A * s to F. Signcryption. F executes the signcryption oracle as follows: F submits msg and A r . C executes C ← Signcrypt(msg, A r , T * s ) and sends C to F. Forgery. F outputs (A * r , T * r ) and fresh ciphertext C * . C executes the following steps:
1) Use sk * r to decrypt c 2 . 2) Use H 2 w 2 2 to decrypt c 5 
Since the signature scheme has SUF-CMA security, the proposed signcryption scheme has SUF-CMA security. Proof: Define the following games between the challenger and the adversary. E i denotes the event b = b.
Game 0 This game is similar to the game defined for
In the challenge stage, the adversary
q × and outputs a guess b. Finally, the challenger C sets b = b. By definition, we have Pr E 0 − 1 2 = ε. Game 1 This game changes the key generation algorithm. Let pk r be a random matrix, and execute TrapGen to generate pk s , sk s . The other steps are identical to the corresponding steps in Game 0 . For m 0 ,
This notation denotes a set that consists of all polynomials whose degrees are below d − 1, and the coefficients are chosen form [m 0 , m 1 ]. The challenger chooses ] ). Define F y (bits) = y 0 + (j 1 ,...,j d )∈S(bits) y 1,j 1 · · · y d,j d . The challenger checks whether the following condition holds F y (bit * ) = 0 ∧ F y (bits 1 ) ∈ R * q ∧ · · · ∧ F y (bits q ) ∈ R * q . bits * is the challenge bit, while bits 1 , · · · , bits q are the bit strings that the adversary queries to H 3 . If the above-mentioned condition does not hold, the challenger omits the output of the adversary, sets b ← R {0, 1}, and terminates the challenge. If it holds, the challenger sets b = b. In this case, we have Pr E 1 − 1 2 ≤ negl(n). Game 2 Change the game such that when F y (bit * ) does not hold, the challenger terminates at the end of the game. The challenger C chooses R 0 ,
× [ ] and computes b 0 = a τ R 0 +y 0 g b and b i,j = a τ R i,j +y i,j g b . The other steps are identical to those of Game 1 . By part 2 of Lemma II.1., we obtain that the following distributions are statistically indistinguishable:
Game 4 In this game, the challenger randomly chooses a τ ← R R 2m q . When the adversary queries the bit string to H 3 , the challenger first computes R bits . If F y (bits) / ∈ R * q , the challenger terminates the challenge and computes v ← SampleRight a τ , g b , R bits , F y (bits), u M , T g b , σ 2 . When we choose the parameter σ 2 properly, the above distribution is statistically close to the following distribution: v ← SampleLeft a τ , u M , T a τ , σ 2 Thus, we have |Pr[E 4 ] − Pr[E 3 ]| ≤ negl(n).
Game 5 Randomly choose v ← R R 2m q , and label v = v 1 ∈ R m q |v 2 ∈ R m q . Randomly choose s 2 ← R R q , sample e 2 ← χ σ 1 , randomly choose r 2 ∈ {0, 1} l , let c 0 = H 3 (r 2 , v 1 ), and compute w = s 2 c 0 + e 2 , w ← dbl(w), c 1 = w 2 , c 2 = w 2 , and c * 3 = H 1 (c 1 , v 2 ). If b = 0, the challenger produces the valid ciphertext. If b = 1 and F y (bits * ) = 0 hold, the challenger selects s ← R R q , samples e ← D coeff Z n ,σ 1 m , computes v = sa τ + e ∈ R 2m , and then com- ReRand rot I k |R bits * , φ(v), σ 1 , σ 2qσ 1 with v = v + e . Compute and output the challenge ciphertext. As demonstrated below, Game 5 and Game 6 are statistically indistinguishable. Assume that there exists an adversary A that can differentiate Game 5 and Game 6 with an overwhelming advantage. Then, we can construct a distinguisher D that breaks the RLWE problem as follows: 
2) COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In Fig. 1 , to simplify the analysis, we set q = 277063. We compare our scheme with YWL [12] , SS [20] , GM [21] , LHY [22] and ZXX [23] in terms of the communication overhead when choosing different dimensions n. According to Fig. 1 , the communication costs of our signcryption schemes are lower than those of other lattice-based signcryption schemes. The measurement units of the vertical coordinate are kilobytes (KB). Let q be the modulus. Let n be the lattice dimension. s ( e ) denotes the number of attributes in a signing (encryption) predicate. |A s |(|A d |) denotes the number of signing (decryption) key attributes. ϕ(e) denotes the number of encryption attributes required in the designcryption process. B G denotes the bit length of an element of the group G. B tt denotes the bit length of the time stamp. |msg| denotes the bit length of a message or plaintext. Table 3 shows a comparison of the PK/SK sizes. A comparison of the ciphertext overhead is listed in Table 4 . Table 5 shows a concrete comparison for realizing 128-bit security when q = 277063, σ = 3.4, and n = 540. In Table 6 , we use M V , S D and S P to denote the vector multiplication, discrete sample, and preimage sample, respectively. E x denotes the exponential operation in G. P a denotes the pairing operation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a more efficient standard model signcryption scheme based on lattices by carefully combining the partitioning technique with several favourable algebraic properties of the tag-based lattice trapdoor, the RLWE problem and the ISIS problem. Compared to current lattice-based signcryption schemes, the proposed scheme not only provides a novel construction idea but also reduces the sizes of the public keys, private keys and ciphertexts. With the rapid development of cloud services, key exposure has been highlighted as a serious security issue. Inspired by [36] , it will be interesting to construct an efficient lattice-based key-exposure resilient aggregate signcryption scheme for secure cloud storage, which we leave for future work.
